

**(WISC: World International Studies Committee Conference
-24-27 Agu 2005-, Bilgi Universitesi Konuşma Metni)**
**A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
CHALLENGES OF ISLAMIC IDENTITY**

Güncel ÖNKAL*

Abstract

(Keywords: 1- Self, 2- Faith as Ideology, 3-Identity over spheres, 4- Secularism, 5- Value considering)

Since Islamic identity and Middle-Eastern societies could not realize the necessary advancements, they are in trouble after two major events:

- I. Kant's ideal of Enlightenment
- II. 9/11 Terrorist Attack

The Enlightenment was not sufficiently considered among Muslim intellectuals and by individual person who has lost his/her 'Self' in behalf of an Absolute-unknown. By means of that missing, a life-style difference radically represents itself in public relations and international aspects. That is why establishing a concrete understanding of middle-east conflicts is a complex field of study. The relativity of religion and culture is a fact in these societies. An analysis of fundamentalism in both sides (Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms) is needed. At that point, what universal idea of human rights and enlightenment require from the members of Humankind is a reject of faith as ideology and uniqueness of truth.

Furthermore, I state that 9/11 Terrorist Attack is the result of partial, uncompleted Enlightenment. It is so because: Islamic identity's patterns of socialization are often arbitrary and authoritarian and emphasize on individual's personal duties to the state or to God rather than a commitment to a broader social ethic. Absolute but abstract values appear to dominate social life despite the fact that they are all the consequences of humanity. Islamic identity is no longer valid. A religion cannot be an identity. The tradition of philosophy and science tell us that a human-being possibly will fulfill his/her identity.

In this paper, my aim is to analyze the confrontation of old believes with new conditions. The main question to 'Islamic identity' is this: "Why one-particular religion is so markedly secularization-resistant?" During my philosophical investigation, my main point will be the secularization process. This unrealized process is a key-concept of the debate so that rethinking the relation of religion and secularism gives us another method of accepting the problem of difference and modernity.

* gonkal@metu.edu.tr, Middle East Technical University, Department of Philosophy, Research Assistant and Canditate of PhD., Ankara/Turkey.

Establishing an understanding of middle-east conflicts is a complex field of study. There are essential steps of that, i.e.:

1. The fact of **relativity of religion and culture** in Middle Eastern societies,
2. Analyzing the roots of **fundamentalism** (in both sides, Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms) with an **objective** approach after 9/11,
3. **Rejecting “Faith as Ideology”, “uniqueness of truth”**,
4. **Accepting** postmodernism’s **reason and religion connection**,
5. **Asking** “why should one-particular religion be so markedly **secularization-resistant**”?

However, some intellectuals, writing on this field, do hesitate taking these steps altogether into consideration. By doing this, we can easily observe in their essays that the philosophical debate between West and East after 9/11 remains insolvable. A philosophical ground and philosophical analysis of *middle-eastern problems* are urgently missing.

In other words, the conflicts of Muslim Middle-Eastern societies are also our conflicts. After Kant’s ideal of enlightenment, Eastern societies could not realize necessary advancements. Individual person has lost his/her ‘Self’ in behalf of an Absolute-unknown. What the Western ideology demands from Eastern societies and individuals seems as if they are impossible notions to be realized. Furthermore, there is a fundamental *life-style* difference represents itself in public relations.

The main attempt of the *Political Philosophy* is giving universally acceptable replies to the question how best to arrange our collective life. Therefore, the collective life of humankind is the problem; thus, a political philosophy must say something about the nature of men according to their needs and capacities in means of whether they are originally selfish or mainly altruistic.

For political-philosophical discussions, on the eve of new century, the crucial problem is the cultural factors that are predominantly shaping individuals. Sets of questions were stemmed from the possible conflicts of different identities.

While analyzing this issue as objectively as I can, searching the fundamentals of the brotherhood of religion and nationalism will be my method which is a brotherhood of a particular civilization, or population namely Middle East.

I. What is missing in Muslim World?

Questions and Answers:

a) Which Democracy?

As democracy has blossomed in Western states over the past three centuries, Muslim societies have usually lived under colonial rulers, kings, or tribal and clan leaders. For some Muslim intellectuals, “neither Islam nor its culture is the major obstacle to political modernity, even if undemocratic rulers sometimes use Islam for their excuse”.¹ That is why Muslim thinkers have always assigned the study of politics to the related religious disciplines of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and theology (*kalam*). Moreover, the Islamic approach to politics was restricted to examining the interrelationship between the state, the rulers, and the Shari’a. In Islamic worldview human rights are granted by God, not by kings or legislative assemblies and therefore they can never be taken away or changed, even temporarily, for any reason. Such a static and dogmatic worldview is the main obstacle of applying human rights and its universal principles properly in Muslim states. This misapplying of human rights concept is not a situation very relevant to traditional Islamic view but Islamic politics.² Laws must be human-centered since they are made for solving practical conflicts between individuals and states. There is a crucial misunderstanding of life by *attaching this profane sphere to transcendental sphere*. Religion, in general, is regarded as an obstacle to modernization:

The Qur’an and the Sunna contain generalities in regard to the political organization of the state. In the course of history different Islamic governments derived their own rationalization from the legitimizing writings of some Islamic scholars who based their work on these generalities.³

The many interpretations and uses of Islam by governments, movements, and individuals have produced a diversity of ideologies, actors, organizations and programs. Islamic movements display a similar diversity, composition is clerical and lay, traditionalist and modernist educated and illiterate, political activist and Sufi mystic,

¹ Wright Robin, “Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation”, **Journal of Democracy**, 7.2, 1996, p.64.

² See Mayer Ann Elizabeth, **Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics**, Westview Press, Boulder and San Francisco, 1995.

³ Tibi Bassam, “Islam and Modern European Ideologies”, **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol:18, No:1 (Feb., 1986), p.15.

moderate and extremist. Modernization required the separation of religion from public life, as modernizing societies progressively and inevitably became secularized. The process of modernization, which includes the impact of reason, science and technology, was seen as encouraging and enhancing this secularization process.⁴

b) Rationality, Development of Science and Fundamentalism

Rationality and bureaucratic organization offered modern man the possibility of effective control over nature and society, liberated him from the anxieties of an unpredictable world and released him from the domination of magical forces. The problem facing modern man was that his social and private worlds had become meaningless. Legal codifications, scientific knowledge, rational organization cannot help us make moral decisions when faced by different courses of action; ultimately, science is irrelevant to the question of formulating the good life. So that, the progressive development of science and the increasing specialization of all fields of knowledge give rise to countless world-views and interpretations of reality, but precisely because these interpretations are infinite, they cannot lay claim to any absolute value. At this point I would like to take **Weber's** discussion of secularization; his argument is not so much that "God is dead" but rather that modern society produces numerous contesting gods who have no power, either individually or collectively. The unitary cosmos of Christianity and of Greek civilization has been replaced by a pluralist world in which no set of values can give a coherent and compelling significance to life at the personal or public level. At a public level, secularization leaves a moral blankness which cannot be filled by scientific advance and cannot be repossessed by the old gods. Weber argued that modern religious movements would be highly artificial and insincere. For example, he bitterly complained about those "café-society intellectuals" who created a dilettantish interest in religious experiences.⁵

Capitalism, as an economic embodiment of rationalization, produces institutional and cultural differentiation and specialization of different social spheres-politics, economics, religion and morality. While social life as a whole becomes more calculable, each sphere of activity is autonomous and has no claim to universal

⁴ Esposito John L., **Islam: The Straight Path**, Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York, 1994, pp.192-193.

⁵ Turner Bryan S., **Weber and Islam**, Routledge, London and New York, Reprint, 1998, p.154.

relevance or communal authority. These institutional changes transform human experience; the individual is forced to make choices between values which are partial and shifting. The result is an existential crisis in terms of meaning of life. In a secular world, the only place for religion is in the area of interpersonal, rather than public relations.

In contrary to Weber, Carroll erroneously argues that there is no necessary relationship between secularization and the development of a modern state.⁶ Carroll notes a differentiation between the concepts of “modern political system”, “political modernization” and “political development”. Here, Weber points a crucial fault of Muslim world, more objectively than Carroll: Weber’s guiding question was; how have the principal values of world religions shaped economic behavior and orientations. Especially in Islamic countries how religion became a world-view. Reflecting the religious values to the life’s reality, economic, political and social relations is the main problem. The Muslim World requires more secularization.

At that point, we should note Gellner’s views on the antagonism between reason and religion. On the question of faith Gellner believes three ideological options are available to us today:⁷

1- *Fundamentalism* believes in a unique truth and believes itself to be in possession of it.

2- *Relativism* forswears the idea of unique truth but tries to treat each particular vision as if it were none the less true (Postmodernist Movement). Gellner is highly critical of it. He sees it as a tool of domination.

3- *Uniqueness of truth*, (enlightenment rationalism/rationalist fundamentalist) which retains the faith in the uniqueness of truth, but does not believe we ever possess it definitely, and which uses, as the foundation of practical conduct and inquiry, loyalty to certain procedural rules.

Religious fundamentalism is particularly strong in Muslim societies, and Gellner investigates why it is so. He finds the explanation in the relationship between high culture and law culture within Islam, where the high culture previously the achievement

⁶ Carroll Terrance G., “Secularization and States of Modernity”, **World Politics**, Vol.36, No.3 (Apr.,1984), p.363.

⁷ See Gellner Ernest, **Postmodernism, Reason and Religion**, Routledge, London and New York, 1993, p. 1-6.

of minority, has now become the pervasive culture of the entire society. This high culture within Muslim societies performs a function very similar to that performed by nationalism elsewhere.⁸

We might expect fanaticism to be more common when there is a single God, than of religions, where the variety of Gods, or forms should create a climate of tolerance. Fundamentalism may derive its character not just from arguments within some body of believers about what God requires but also from largely secular nationalist struggles.

There is one point of truth in that: The close ties between religion, ethnicity, and nationalism found in the contemporary Islamic cases were common in the West's past and are now rare. In general, fundamentalisms rest on the claim that some source of ideas usually a text, is inerrant and complete. They are radical revisions of the past provoked by changes that threaten the continuity of the tradition. In that sense fundamentalisms are reactive. Their conservatism is not conservation but a creative reworking of the past for present purposes. The goal of resistance is to re-create the enticement and commitment of the original believing community. Modernization is the fragmentation of social institutions into ever more specialized units and the division of social life into distinct spheres, each with their own values and procedures.

c) Secularism Wanted:

Muslim societies now find themselves as they face the inescapable challenges of secularization in the modern world. It should be stressed that secularization is a comparatively recent phenomenon. It began in Western Europe and has spread throughout the world. Its speed and exact form have varied a great deal from place to place, depending on a host of political, sociological, economic, and other variables. The world's religions have adopted varying responses to it, usually featuring some mixture of adaptation and self-defense designed to meet the new conditions. In short, societies have shown different ways of responding to the secularizing tendency. Muslim societies have not experienced secularization as an internal or autonomous move:

⁸ See also: Sunar, İlkay "Civil Society and Islam" in Özdalga Elizabeth (ed.) , Persson Sune (ed.), **Civil Society, Democracy and The Muslim World**, (Papers Read at a Conference Held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul), Swedish Research Institute Transactions, Vol. 7., Istanbul Numune Matbaasi, Reprinted 2002, pp.9-11.

Secularist resistance to political Islam in most parts of the region is defensive and often compromising. Given the weakened state of the left and the crisis of ideology, secular intellectuals are without clear vision or policies. Democracy and human rights have become their ultimate refuge. Even these areas are contested by Islamists, and in some cases secularists do make common cause with Liberal Islamists against government violations.⁹

External influences either started the secularization process or disrupted it. But lack of secularization is a reality in the Muslim world. For some no Muslim society today is governed solely with reference to religious law; religious traditions no longer possess absolute or near-absolute predominance (except perhaps in some remote rural areas); and newly emerging leadership classes are almost everywhere displacing or marginalizing the religious experts who used to control meaning and organization in these societies. But while all this has been happening, Islamic reformation has not yet been accomplished. In the Muslim world, secularization is preceding religious reformation--a reversal of the European experience in which secularization was more or less a consequence of such reformation.

Secularism in Islam, properly speaking, is the acceptance of laws and other social and political institutions without reference to Islam, namely without being derived from, or organically linked with, the principles of the Qur'ân and the Sunna. In the West, however, there is a pervasive confusion with regard to the concept of secularism in Islamic society.¹⁰

Secular attitudes and procedures are an important fact of reality in the Muslim world. The actual workings of the governmental institutions in all Muslim countries are secular. The most important fact about this phenomenon, however, is that, this secularism is forced by, a natural reaction to the *conservative forces* in Islam which did not and still do not allow a consistent and large-scale rethinking of the content of the Shari'a at an ethico-legal plane.¹¹ Not even Turkey, where secularism has been espoused expressly and as a principle is an exception to this for, in fact, Turkish secularism was historically induced, not on a philosophical basis, but as the stark

⁹ **Ibid**, p.15.

¹⁰ Rahman Fazlur, "Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives", **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol.1, No.4, Oct 1970, p.330.

¹¹ **Ibid**.

alternative to conservatism. The will to return to Islam remains strong enough on the part of the modernized classes. This is a very strong possibility and certain current trends in the rising Muslim middle class support this alternative.

In another sense, however, secular is quite often used as well to describe non-or antireligious, philosophically liberal-, social-, or socialist-democratic forms of separating religion and politics. These uses borrow on non-and/or antireligious connotations of the term stressing the availability of “secular moralities that are logically independent of religion.” Although the relationship between secularism and democracy has been subject to great contestation recently, secularism’s rejection of religious imposition and citizenship criteria (for both religious and nonreligious citizens) along with its legitimation of non-and antireligious ways of thinking and living—the multiple and dynamic ways of being that one may find within a given political space—has made it a common centerpiece of democratic political theory. As an ideal, democratic secularism enables more inclusive, tolerant polities and more varied forms of social and public experience—ensuring “freedom from religion as well as freedom of religion.”¹² Difficulties have emerged recently with the claim, heard around the world, that secularism is hostile to free religious expression in political life and is thus highly antidemocratic. It’s not clear whether or not the root cause of such critiques is “secularism.” Still, philosophically, an important debate has emerged over whether or not secularism is an indispensable tool for creating political norms in contexts of radical difference “whatever else one may believe about human life and God’s demands” or a narrow, dogmatic, and colonizing metaphysic that assimilates and does violence to difference and must therefore itself be thrown away.

What is important in the context of this paper is that the concept secular largely maintains a meaning of “nonreligious” in these debates. Contemporary democratic secular arrangements certainly do not satisfy all religionists or non-religionists, but they satisfy many, and the reason they do is that, by dissociating religion from politics or the state, such forms of secularism secure the loyalty of nonreligious people (who see no imposition of religion) for, nonreligious reasons (e.g., “democracy”) and religious

¹² Davison Andrew, “Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State? The Challenge of Description”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102:2/3, Spring/Summer 2003.

people (who see no interference by the state) for, religious reasons. A great deal of global evidence suggests, moreover, that, in the context of modern political power relationships, these religionists include members of religious traditions other than Christianity. In terms of the meaning of secular, it should be noted that even the friendly or non-antagonistic relationship toward religion and religious practices found in some such arrangements does not compromise the nonreligious meaning ascribed to the character of the state. In such cases, the meaning of secularism itself remains “nonreligious.” By “secular state,” one understands a “religion-free” state.

Rethinking the relation of religion and secularism gives us another means of understanding the problem of difference and modernity. Only the establishment of a secular public sphere can provide the basis for nonviolent relations to substantive difference. Religion appears to be a threat to secular, liberal society, a threat to women and a source of violence.

At that point we are able to discuss a new face of religion differs itself from the traditionalist relation in three main points:

1. The New Position of Religion:

As Van der Zweerde notes, “religion has been rehabilitated among secularized intellectuals.”¹³ At that point, it should be mentioned that a debate over what secularism is and how can be applied are still questionable. In its pure understanding, secularism means to divide two worlds, i.e., “this world” and “the other world” definitely. In this world, what factual is welcomed. Beside this, the personal and emotional relations of the persons to “the other world” are shaping their private sphere which is situated or at least must be out of the common-political and social interest. Post 9/11, this definition became a *negative* meaning for some particular religious people and intellectuals in terms of limiting basic humanitarian rights. Unfortunately, this correlation, making by especially Eastern and Muslim intellectuals, inherently possesses a variety of misunderstandings of concepts such as *humanity*, *religion* and *rights for freedom*. Religion does not give rights to people. Religion is a style and a ritual of individual worshipping and praying that was historically and traditionally situated by God. It is

¹³ Van der Zweerde, Evert.: “...But Where is The State?”, **Studies in Intercultural Philosophy, Civil Society, Religion and the Nation, Modernization in Intercultural Context: Russia, Japan, Turkey**, (ed.) Gerrit Steunebrink, Evert van der Zweerde, Amsterdam, Rodopi, Vol:14, 2004, p.280.

compulsory for a candid believer. On the other hand, an atheist has right not to disturb and force to believe in realizing some rituals and absolute premises. It is as natural as the first case. Now, this is the exact humanity: freedom for all in conditions of showing **mutual recognition and respect**.

Furthermore, “religion has turned in different forms to the public sphere: Fundamentalism and theocracy.”¹⁴ What Van der Zweerde does not mention here is the third type of religion’s illusory transparency in contemporary societies: The notion of Nation-state!

“Nation-state as the main type of polity is losing its central and exclusive position, but still dominates our thinking.”¹⁵ It is appropriate to give the example of Turkey:

Islam in Turkey is distinguished by considerable diversity, both in ideational content and in institutional forms. In political expression and organization, Islam is not restricted to one party and...it is even more developed socially and culturally than it is politically. Turkish Islam is distinguished by a high degree of institutional differentiation from secular counterparts in separate trade unions, business associations, foundations, educational and media activities. Some Muslim cultural and intellectual milieus display a high level of vitality and innovation, compared to the stereotypical products of much of political Islam.¹⁶

In addition, as Tapper concludes; in Turkey, “nationalism is associated with Islam in the form of a fundamentalist ideology” and “social construction of the self and personal identity are described by both.”¹⁷

Such an environment of Turkish type of Islam is motivated with a giant and stable idea of Nation-State ideal. On the age of Globalization, most of Turkish citizens prefer not to be a member of EU since they hesitate losing their religion and particular but absolute values. This paradoxical nature of religious citizens, in other words conformists use doctrine of Nationalism.

This new dimension of religion can also be considered as a shield against extraordinary. Not just for Turkish situation, but Britain also used religion as a shield as Van der Veer notes; “...there is sufficient evidence that the arrival of Muslim

¹⁴ **Ibid.**

¹⁵ **Ibid.**, p.276.

¹⁶ Zubaida, Sami. “Turkish Islam and National Identity”, **Middle East Report**, No:199, Turkey: Insolvent Ideologies, Fractured State, Apr.-Jun. 1996, p.15.

¹⁷ Tapper, Richard. (ed.) **Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State**, I.B. Tauris&Co.Ltd. Publishers, London and new York, 1991, p.61.

immigrants in Britain has made Christianity once again an important element in the defense of national identity.”¹⁸ Moreover, Van der Veer uses Foucault’s and Eickelman’s views on this topic:

...In Foucault’s terms; the state is totalizing and individualizing at the same time. The boundaries of the state are notoriously difficult to define. The state appears to be a sovereign authority above and outside society, but Foucault has pointed out that the modern state works internally through disciplinary power, not by constraining individuals and their actions, but by producing them. The individual, civil political subject is produced in churches, schools and factories.¹⁹

By that, religion is not only important in the shaping of individual conscience and civilized conduct but also in the creation of the public sphere.²⁰

New religion, in both Western and Eastern sides, became a tool of mass communication. David Eickelman calls this process as “objectification”. Believers started to ask many philosophical questions to their religions itself. Why do I believe? What do I believe in? These questions also are being discussed on TVs, radios, internet pages and forums. Post 9/11, especially Islam be converted into a subject that has to be explained and understood.²¹

What important for Political Philosophy studies is this: Religion is no longer a religion. Religion, in particular Islam, turns out to be a philosophical question rather than a metaphysics or belief. This new position of Religion may give way to development of humanitarian ideals and *mondialisation/globalization*. The prejudices of non-development countries that are sourced from Religion and dogmas are replacing with new visions.

This opportunism of secularization will light our ways. However, there is another obstacle on the path towards being a *world citizen*: Nation-state.

¹⁸ Van der Veer, Peter.: “Religion, Nation and the Public Sphere”, **Studies in Intercultural Philosophy, Civil Society, Religion and the Nation, Modernization in Intercultural Context: Russia, Japan, Turkey**, (ed.) Gerrit Steunebrink, Evert van der Zweerde, Amsterdam, Rodopi, Vol:14, 2004, p.245.

¹⁹ **Ibid.**, p.246.

²⁰ This idea will be discussed at the third part of the paper in detail.

²¹ Also see: Ahmed, Akbar S.: **Postmodernism and Islam**, Routledge, London and New York, 1992.pp.222-242. (The Evil Demon: The Media as Master)

2. The State as Nation and as Notion:

For Tibi, national-state arose from the Ottoman Empire.²² Approaching the state as a notion, in the liberal national state model, shared symbols (flags, anthems, heroes, etc...) are not ethnic bounds that relate citizens to be one another in a communicative discursive text:

This means that norms and values that have been developed in a communicative discourse are then shared by the entire populace. Ethnic bounds, on the contrary, suggest that a community shares common descent. There can be also a mixture between ethnicity and national awareness, for example the local ethnic sentiments in a country.²³

If a state is considered as “nation”, ethnicity and identity problems will probably arise. Beside this, my suggestion is to evaluate the state as notion. The notion of state is very old. From the beginning of Humankind, men desired to live together. Religion can be conceptualized according to this sense: In conceptualizing the social functions of religion in human societies;

...sociologists of religion have either approached religion as a form of social cement that creates a bond between potentially antagonistic individuals or as a form of social opium that surpasses the conflict of interests between antagonistic social groups. On both accounts, religion functions to preserve social groups.²⁴

The role of ideology in society, especially religious teaching on sexuality and family life, is to secure to social conditions by which this reproduction of human bodies can take place.²⁵ Thus, nation-state implies religious ideology and totalitarian values. These absolute values mostly stem from dominant religious beliefs. The real-Self loses itself under the dogmatic and *sacred* umbrella of national ideology that is supported by a Religion. This characteristic of states as nations is no longer valid. Globalization dictates us to reconsider our states as notions. Our nations should be philosophically analyzed and modernized.

²² Tibi, Bassam.: **The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and New World Order**, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1998, p.125.

²³ **Ibid.**, pp.125.-126.

²⁴ Turner, Bryan S.: **Religion and Social Theory**, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Reprinted, 1999, p.109.

²⁵ **Ibid.**, p.110.

3. The Power of Public Sphere as a New Political Institution:

Globalization has resulted in a new level of multiculturalism which has challenged much of the traditional dominant cultures of national-states. The constant reproduction of the old high culture of the elite is now problematic and has been questioned by marginal groups within the nation-state and by educated groups rising to cultural dominance as a consequence of decolonization.²⁶

We face to *a new type of society*. We have to describe social reality according to this new phenomenon. It is Public Sphere! Public Sphere is a new criterion to control or reply multiplicity and extraordinary demands of humanitarian rights. However, on the hands of national-states, public sphere does not supply variety of thoughts; it is become a dogmatic power of the governments. Public Sphere is a guarantee to protect the rights of *each person*. This new political Institution has philosophical grounds:

- a. Public Sphere is a new dimension to realize freedom in behalf of universal human rights,
- b. Public Sphere is a secular position of being against the absolutism of A Religion in the society,
- c. Public Sphere is an objectification of national history and its products,
- d. Public Sphere is a moral guide that have been ruled by universal morals,
- e. Public Sphere is a platform to be criticized and to criticize,
- f. Public Sphere can be a view of a society towards Globalization.

²⁶ Turner, Bryan S.: **Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism**, Routledge, London and New York, 1994, p.183.

II. Analyze of Turkish Model :

There is a problem in the social construction of the Self and personal identity. It is so because “patterns of socialization are often arbitrary and authoritarian and emphasize on individual’s personal duties to the state or to God rather than a commitment to a broader social ethic.”²⁷ In Turkey, nationalism is associated with Islam in the form of a fundamentalist ideology.

Republican values appear to dominate social life. A social continuity with Ottoman values and forms of social control by using these key-concepts; sincerity friendship, humanity, neighborliness, civilization, sophistication, hospitality; on the other hand some values like respect, duty, purity, honor, self-discipline by using Islam.

28

Secularization and industrialization have taken different forms in different parts of the Islamic world. To indicate,

I have attempted to suggest that Turkish secularization differed from its European counterpart in two important respects. Firstly secularization was forced through as a political measure under the control of an autocratic and stait government, secularization did not spring solely and automatically from economic modernization, but was the consequence of a series of difficult political choices. Secondly, Turkish secularization was consciously mimetic in that it took Europe as its specific model of adaptation.²⁹

Kemalists had by their reforms demonstrated that men could quite swiftly transform institutions which had been regarded as divinely ordained and immutable. Under the new conditions, Islam had to compete and blend with a variety of different ideological perspectives which made different intellectual claims and required different types of commitment. Having lost its public monopoly of values, Islam became an uncertain basis of personal piety. By imitating Western secularization, Islam had also to face the paradox of “choosing to believe”: “....the greatest problem of modernization of all for Islam is not whether it can contribute to political, familial or personal

²⁷ Tapper Richard, **Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State**, I.B.Tauris Publishers, London and New York, 1991, p.61.

²⁸ **Ibid.**, p.62.

²⁹ **Ibid.**, p.168.

modernization but whether it can effectively meet the specifically religious needs of the modern Muslim peoples.”³⁰

A majority of Turkish citizens do not perceive a contradiction between Islam and their attachment to Kemalist symbols, viewing both as integral to national identity. Kemalist secularism, with its history of controlling religion, is a major factor making Islam in Turkey different from Islam elsewhere. The mainstream center-right parties have always contained significant Islamist elements, including deputies in the parliament. This Islamist presence became more open and active in the relatively permissive atmosphere of the Özal era in the 1980s.³¹

The Islamist current has elicited resistance from secularist forces in all the countries in the region. Much of this resistance comes from the Westernized bourgeois elites. “The fact of the matter is that, despite the liberal rhetoric, emoting from mainstream Islamist leadership in recent years, there is an inherent thrust in political Islam towards social authoritarianism.”³²

This social authoritarianism threatens to extend to the liberties and lifestyles of many social groups with regard to restrictions on women, segregation of the sexes in public places, limitations on public entertainment and celebrations, access to theaters, bars and cafes, and the like. Unfortunately, this incorrect image of Turkey influences our country’s future on the eve of EU. A foreign intellectual states this image;

Islam in Turkey is distinguished by considerable diversity, both in ideational content and in institutional forms. In political expressions and organization, Islam is not restricted to one party and it is even more developed socially and culturally than it is politically: “Turkish Islam is distinguished by a high degree of institutional differentiation from secular counterparts in separate trade unions, business associations, foundations, educational and media activities.”³³

He also notes that this image was constructed by political leaders for the sake of taking more votes from illiterate voters, because;

A majority of Turkish citizens do not perceive a contradiction between Islam and their attachment to Kemalist symbols, viewing both as integral to national identity...Kemalist secularism, with its history of controlling religion is a major factor making Islam in Turkey different from Islam elsewhere. The mainstream

³⁰ **Ibid**, p.170, from Robert N. Bellah, “Islamic Tradition and the Problems of Modernization”, **International Yearbook For The Sociology of Religion**, 1970, Vol. 6, p.81.

³¹ Zubaida Sami, “Turkish Islam and National Identity”, **Middle East Report No:199, Turkey: Insolvent Ideologies, Fractured State** (Apr-June, 1996), p.11

³² **Ibid**, p.14.

³³ **Ibid**.

center-right parties have always contained significant Islamist elements, including deputies in the parliament. This Islamist presence became more open and active in the relatively permissive atmosphere of the Ozal era, in the 1980s.³⁴

To sum up, I would like to share Tapper's conclusions of his one of the sociological field-study realized in Eğirdir:

- "In Turkey, nationalism is associated with Islam in the form of a fundamentalist ideology.
- There is a problem in the social construction of the self and personal identity. It is so because "patterns of socialization and often arbitrary and authoritarian and emphasize an individual's personal duties to the state or to God rather than a commitment to a broader social ethic."
- Republican values appear to dominate social life. A social continuity with Ottoman values and forms of social control by using these key-concepts:
 - o Sincerity friendship
 - o Humanity
 - o Neighbourliness
 - o Civilization
 - o Sophistication
 - o Hospitality
 - o Respect
 - o Duty
 - o Purity
 - o Honour
 - o Self-discipline

These values are by using Islam, is possible to be both a good Turk and a good muslim."³⁵

III. Conceptual Re-Islamization from Western Outlook and Islamic Identity in- Itself:

After analyzing Turkish secular model that has been appreciated by Western outlook -as Esposito says- we should consider that: "In the course of the 20th century, the idea of secularism has much too often been limited first to a kind of anti-religious device, and more recently to an anti 'culture of the Other' This type of secularism which is very far from the original and real meaning of the term does indeed create a problem of coexistence."³⁶

³⁴ **Ibid.**, p.11.

³⁵ Tapper, **Ibid.**, pp.61-63.

³⁶ Esposito John L.(ed) , François Burgat (ed), **Modernizing Islam: religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and The Middle East**, Hurst&Co Ltd., London 2003, p.34.

Social adaptation and an individualization rather than privatization is needed. Such an individualization process strongly requests a collective and social identification without religious traditional prejudices. It is obvious that the phenomenon of moral corruption makes cultural Islam to be more religious in some countries. To define Islam as the only identity of existence and to have an Islamic life-style should be evaluated in terms of individualization, economic and cultural/educational development, and the concepts of modern society, civil society, pluralism and change in values.³⁷

³⁷ See: **Ibid.**

CONCLUSION

We are facing such a new situation thanks to Globalization that mutual recognition and respect is inevitable. In such a situation, religion is not the same. Liberal approaches to religion are increased and the notion of tolerance becomes a condition after 9/11.

Particular cultures (micro-cultures) and traditions are seen more valuable but less functional. The control over particularity and multiplicity lost its strong position and legitimacy but is replaced with Public Sphere. Public Sphere is a new tool of legitimacy using by governments especially in National-States. Turkish identity model indicates this: These values should not be dependent upon the religion or God, or other sorts of absolute entities, also culture. Values such as duty, civilization, honor, etc...are all the consequences of humanity. Humankind has made it along his history and philosophical background. Religious and fundamentalist lifestyle is inaccurate and cannot be an identity. A human may fulfill his/her identity.

The notion of state has changed. Religion and the State as Nation had been seen same and inseparable before the Terrorist Attack made happen.

For Turkey, the definition of individual has changed. Additionally, "individual" is the fundamental of everything even the State. It is very interesting that secular tendency and social-democratic notion is being used by conformists for the undeniable and basic demands of all individuals.

To sum up, philosophy of society/ political philosophy is chiefly studying on "culture" and "social notions of individuals" nowadays. "Identity problem" and "the Other for realizing the idea of together" are more philosophical now. Those are the concepts of our philosophical analysis of fundamental challenges of Islamic identity:

- 1.Reactive, anti-modern and anti-rationalist
- 2.Ideological
- 3.Unable to reflect its variety and cultural diversity
- 4.Epistemologically a social territorialization of the Absolute
- 5.Fundamentalist and intolerant
- 6.Static, undemocratic, incompatible with distinction between Islams by describing the relation between society, politics and religion.

And as a consequence my intention is to take attention three points: Firstly, Western outlook is very important: Wrong type of secularism gives way to be fundamentalist and conservativist tendencies. However, Islamic policies and the Muslim peoples must reconsider their perception of Western civilization. Secondly, it is still problematic to define Islamic identity in-itself. Evaluating Islamic identity in-itself is nearly impossible. Finally, political sphere should be differentiate itself from the religious sphere. We all know that some crises results from not the Islamic culture itself but the radical politics.

REFERENCES

1. Ahmed, Akbar S., **Postmodernism and Islam**, Routledge, London and New York, 1992.
2. Al-Azmeh, Aziz, **Islams and Modernities**, Verso, London and New York, 1993.
3. Carroll Terrance G., "Secularization and States of Modernity", **World Politics**, Vol.36, No.3 (Apr.,1984).
4. Davison Andrew, "Turkey, a 'Secular' State?The Challenge of Description", **The South Atlantic Quarterly**, 102:2/3, Spring/Summer 2003.
5. Esposito John L., **Islam: The Straight Path**, Oxford University Press, Oxford& New York, 1994.
6. Esposito John L.(ed) , Fronçois Burgat (ed), **Modernizing Islam: religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and The Middle East**, Hurst&Co Ltd., London 2003.
7. Gellner Ernest, **Postmodernism, Reason and Religion**, Routledge, London and New York, 1993.
8. Mayer Ann Elizabeth, **Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics**, Westview Press, Boulder and San Francisco, 1995.
9. Miller, David, "Political Philosophy", **Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy**, Version 1.0, London and New York, Routledge, 1998.
10. Ozay Mehmet, **Islamic Identity and Development**, Routledge, London and New York, 1990.
11. Özdalga Elizabeth (ed.) , Persson Sune (ed.), **Civil Society, Democracy and The Muslim World**, (Papers Read at a Conference Held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul), Swedish Research Institute Transactions, Vol. 7., Istanbul Numune Matbaasi, Reprinted 2002.
12. Rahman Fazlur, "Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives", **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol.1, No.4, Oct 1970.
13. Sami Zubaida, "Turkish Islam and National Identity", **Middle East Report No:199, Turkey: Insolvent Ideologies, Fractured State** (Apr-June, 1996).
14. Tapper Richard, **Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State**, I.B.Tauris Publishers, London and New York, 1991.

15. Tayob Abdulkader, "Reading Religion and Religious in Modern Islam", **ISIM Review**, 15, Spring 2005.
16. Tibi Bassam, "Islam and Modern European Ideologies", **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol:18, No:1 (Feb., 1986).
17. Tibi Bassam, **Islam between Culture and Politics**, Palgrave, Great Britain, 2001.
18. Tibi, Bassam.: **The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and New World Order**, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1998.
19. Turner, Bryan S.: **Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism**, Routledge, London and New York, 1994.
20. Turner, Bryan S.: **Religion and Social Theory**, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Reprinted, 1999.
21. Turner Bryan S., **Weber and Islam**, Routledge, London and New York, Reprint,1998.
22. Van der Veer, Peter.: "Religion, Nation and the Public Sphere", **Studies in Intercultural Philosophy, Civil Society, Religion and the Nation, Modernization in Intercultural Context: Russia, Japan, Turkey**, (ed.) Gerrit Steunebrink, Evert van der Zweerde, Amsterdam, Rodopi, Vol:14, 2004.
23. Van der Zweerde, Evert.: "...But Where is The State?", **Studies in Intercultural Philosophy, Civil Society, Religion and the Nation, Modernization in Intercultural Context: Russia, Japan, Turkey**, (ed.) Gerrit Steunebrink, Evert van der Zweerde, Amsterdam, Rodopi, Vol:14, 2004.
24. Wright Robin, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation", **Journal of Democracy**, 7.2, 1996.
25. Zubaida, Sami. "Turkish Islam and National Identity", **Middle East Report**, No:199, Turkey: Insolvent Ideologies, Fractured State, Apr.-Jun. 1996.